SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
INTERVIEW WITH THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER EDITORIAL BOARD
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Secretary Perry: I came out here for two different reasons. First of all was to give the talk this morning to the Reserve Officers Association which is meeting here in Seattle. I believe particularly with the drawdown of the forces that we're going through now, that maintaining the effectiveness and efficiency of the reserves is really a key to overall force quality.

Secondly, I visited two of our bases yesterday--McChord Air Force Base and Fort Lewis. I try to get to one of our bases at least once a month, sometimes a couple of times a month, as part of my view of how to manage things.

When I was in industry, I used the technique which some people call MBWA, management by walking around. I find that you learn more about what's really happening in a place by going and talking with people than by reading the memos they send you in which they describe what's happening.

McChord, in particular, had a big event yesterday--you had some people out there covering it, actually--the so-called rodeo, which is a competition, an exercise in air mobility. They brought together not only units from all over the country, but units from all over the world. There were more than 20 countries represented there, 12 of whom were actively participating in the competition. That is, they were competing reserve units, active units from the U.S. versus units from United Kingdom, Germany, there must have been about eight or nine other countries besides those I've already mentioned in the competition. It was sort of the world series of air mobility exercises.

The key to come out of that activity was, the key emphasis of that exercise and my interest in it had to do with readiness and it had to do with joint training.

This was joint in several senses of the word. All services were represented. Almost by definition, airlift is something that one service does for another service, so all services were represented there. It was joint in the sense that many different nations, 12 different nations were participating all told. And it was joint between the reserve and the active components. In fact, the split in the U.S. forces, they were about 50/50 between reserve components and active.

One of the groups I visited was from Travis Air Force Base. The active unit from Travis and the reserve unit from Travis were side by side, competing with each other. As of the time I was there, they were within one point of each other in the competition. Indeed, it's a characteristic, I think, of our air mobility forces, that the reserve forces generally are about as good as the active forces.

Q: They're also a larger and larger component of that air mobility...

A: They are.. Fifty percent at this exercise was fairly representative.

Now we get a special break in that activity because an awful lot of the people from the reserves have full time jobs with airlines--pilots, mechanics, so they bring their skills ready made to the job. It's harder to find a tank driver, for example, who has a civilian job which prepares him adequately for that sort of a job. But we take full advantage of that.

One of my big objectives as Secretary of Defense is to apply that sort of peacetime use of reserve forces to other components to a much greater extent. The Air Force in their Transportation Command is doing a very, very good job of that, but we'd like to get more of that in other forces as well.

I also had a good visit with the 1st Corps down at Fort Lewis. That's also an interesting reserve story, because the 1st Corps is a very small corps in terms of numbers of active duty. It's a corps which is fleshed out largely by reserve forces before it goes overseas. They do an excellent job of bringing the reserve and the active together in sort of a seamless interface.

It also points out something of interest to this area here, which is, you are a hub, a center, for the joint operations, and if we ever have to deploy a joint force anywhere in the Pacific, this will be an obvious center for doing that, with McChord, Fort Lewis, and the Navy all having major bases here and major activities. Indeed, the 1st Corps is here for just that reason.

I guess Ed Offley is not here today?

Q: He's in Korea.

A: I'm sorry he's not here, but I'm glad he's in Korea, because I would have wanted to have talked with him about that. I think it's important for him to get a first-hand view of the situation over there. I was there just a little over a month ago and have subsequently met with all of our CINCs, all of our Commanders-in-Chief, who are involved with any Korean contingency, so I'm keeping a pretty close tab on the situation there. I hope he comes back with the same observations I came back with which is that our forces there are in a very high state of readiness. That's one aspect of the problem. The other aspect is I did not see then, I do not see now, any imminent danger of military confrontation there. There's a lot of political tension--some of which has been, hopefully, defused lately. But even when the political tension was highest there was no great military tension. The sort of indicators you would look for which would suggest that an attack was about to begin were not there and are not there today.

Q: High level talks are scheduled between the United States and North Korea the end of this month, as I understand it. Given the past history, it seems to me likely that North Korea will talk about its desire to see our military presence in South Korea reduced somewhat. I'd like to ask you what you think the prognosis for our troop strength in South Korea is? Can you foresee any reduction from the approximately 36,000 military personnel there now in the foreseeable future? What would it take for that to occur?

A: It would take very fundamental changes that are probably beyond the scope of the talks that we're talking about now. The troops that we have there are not there because of the nuclear threat to North Korea, they're there because of the conventional military threat. The North Koreans have approximately a million men in their army, two-thirds of which are located within about 50 miles of the border. So, this is what anybody I think would fairly call a forward deployment of their forces. They've got two or three times as much artillery and tanks--very offensive units--than the South Koreans have. They've got large numbers of special operations forces for working behind the lines. All in all, it poses a menacing military threat.

You could detach that from any political situation and still have to responsibly take some action to defend against the existential threat represented by those military forces.

In the last year or so, they've aggravated that threat by very belligerent rhetoric. Talking about reunifying the peninsula by whatever means necessary in '95. They've talked about turning Seoul into a sea of flames. That creates a political environment which aggravates the fact of the military forces.

Then, of course, they've had this nuclear weapon program under development.

So, there are three different elements to be concerned about. The talks are directed, first of all, to removing the nuclear weapon as a future aggravation to that threat, and if they are successful, that will be a major step forward. But in order for we, or the South Koreans to have any reason to consider lowering the number of forces we have there, there would have to be major reduction in the conventional military component of their force as well.

Q: I'm curious about the capacity of the North Koreans to fight, the numbers notwithstanding, and respecting the fact that Seoul is so close to the 38th Parallel. But we were given horror stories about the Iraqi army, its numbers, it tanks, in keeping with sort of the body count mentality of the Vietnam era, and that army wasn't in any way able to stand on the field with the United States military. They had a few divisions of Republican Guards that put up a fight, but when it came to the big show, their air force had fled, and we made mincemeat of them.

To what extent is the North Korean army a real military threat? I'm not saying they can't shoot and that they can't make some gains, but to what extent are they really a match for the American forces in South Korea?

A: That's a very good point, and let me answer that as precisely as I can. I don't want to be misleading. I believe, the quality of the South Korean forces is better than the quality of the North Korean forces in terms of training and readiness and equipment. That's the first point.

Secondly, the quality of the American forces are dramatically better than all of those components in the North Korean forces, but we only have 36,000 American forces over there, compared to about a million North Korean forces. So, that by itself is not a sufficient equalizer.

In the Desert Storm experience you used, by the time we got into combat we had essentially equality in terms of numbers.

Any of the war planning that we have looked at for Korea, any Korean military contingency, we have concluded that we would decisively defeat the North Korean forces, primarily because of this edge in capability, a substantial edge in capability that we have. But it takes some time to build up the U.S. forces to cause that defeat from the 36,000 we have over there now to the number of squadrons and divisions that can decisively effect that defeat.

Therefore, the major issue in any planning for any military conflict in Korea is how quickly U.S. forces could effect a reinforcement. And in particular, how quickly we can get our tactical air squadrons over there. All of our planning is organized around getting them over there in days as opposed to weeks, but there's

no way we can get large numbers of ground forces over there in days. They had to be moved over by ship.

Q: That raises one of the issues that came out of Desert Storm, which was airlift capacity. We were noting earlier this morning that the funding for the B-2 bomber is continuing. Are you getting adequate funding for airlift capacity which was on the short end in that?

A: The FY95 budget still is not determined finally, but it appears as if we will be getting funding for the C-17 which we requested, and we'll be able to proceed forward to six C-17s in this budget. That is what we requested, and I think we're going to get that. That will move the program forward at an appropriate pace for this level in the program.

If the C-17 funding turns out the way it now looks like it's going to turn out, we will be quite satisfied with that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, yesterday you were the subject of a headline that you might not wish to be in Newsday. "Two top Pentagon officials on the payroll of Martin Marietta before joining the Clinton Administration quietly made an unprecedented agreement last year to give the defense contractor at least $60 million in taxpayer's money to help finance the company's purchase of a rival company."

Two questions on that. First, will you respond to the implication of the story of conflict of interest? And secondly, are we in a situation where the President is talking about taking people off welfare but, as we ramp down the Pentagon spending, we keep certain of its major contractors essentially on the public dole to maintain their capability of producing weapons?

A: I'd be delighted to respond to both of those issues.

First of all, the conflict of interest issue is pure baloney. It's outrageous. I'm just really furious at the allegation. Even the facts of the story, as presented there, do not back it up. The statement is that I at one time worked as a consultant for Martin Marietta, and that at a later time in history took an action affecting Martin Marietta suggesting, therefore, that there's somehow a connection between those two.

The conflict of interest legislations which we have in our government are very strict and very severe, and all presidential appointees, including myself, had to go through those before we were accepted for a job in the government. That is, we have to totally and completely divest ourselves of any financial connection, any

connection in any way, with the companies we previously worked with. That I did, and that Dr. Deutch did also.

The implication, and I might say I did that at some considerable financial sacrifice. It wasn't anything I happily did, but that is what we require of people who go into government and take positions as presidential appointees.

Having done that, to suggest that a decision I take a year later or two years later has somehow a lingering affect from a job I used to have, I think is just outrageous. There's not a shred of information anywhere in that story which suggests why a former contact might have influenced or affected what I'm doing today.

The broad issue raised by that story is, can anybody serve a position in government who has previously served for any other company? Or does one have to be in government service for his entire career in order to be free of these kinds of allegations?

I think, an argument can be made that our conflict of interest laws put a very heavy burden on people coming into the government, and as a consequence, many people simply turn down the opportunity to serve in government because they find the financial loss involved in all the divestitures as being too heavy. But some people, and I was one of them, agreed to take those losses and come in, and I'm just outraged that a story like this comes out which doesn't even suggest that I violated the legislation in the ethics conflicts as set up, it just seems to imply somehow that these ethics restrictions are...

Q: The second point of his question had to do with the policy of your decision. Is that good public policy?

A: It is a decision which I have, on this broader issue of public policy, I did not support then and I do not support now, supporting using public money to support any defense company in bailing out a company or maintaining it in existence because that company needs to be supported.

I have taken positions on some issues which I've been very clear and very explicit about, that there are some capabilities which the Defense Department needs, which we should continue to support. The most prominent of them, and the most significant of which, and what's gotten most publicity, is our decision that we will build another Seawolf Submarine, the SSN-23. This is a cost of several billion dollars, and at a time when we are reducing our submarine force. The point I have made and testified a dozen times to the Congress about, is that in order to preserve the capability of building nuclear submarines, we cannot shut down the line and then ten years later bring it up again.

So, what we have chosen to do instead, and this is the public policy question that's important here. What we have chosen to do instead is we have gone down from building three submarines a year to building one submarine every three years. That reduces, of course, the ongoing cost. It's not a very efficient way to build submarines, but it does keep a cadre of people together who maintain the capability of being able to build submarines.

The Congress will have to decide whether or not they think that is, that decision on a case-by-case basis is worth the expense. But we have been very, very explicit and very open that this is what we mean by industrial policy. We will not bail out any company, we will not take any action to keep a company going. But if a capability is important to defense and is unique, then we may spend some funds to keep that...

Q: In the case of Martin Marietta, the $60 million that was granted to it, as I understand it, was for them to purchase the Space Division of General Dynamics. How does this fit your criteria for...

A: To be honest with you, I don't even know what that case is and I haven't had a chance to look it up yet. It wasn't one that I personally had much to do with. I will have to look up that case and see if there's some specific judgment I can make as to the wisdom of that decision. But I'm confident on the basis of the decision, and the basis of the decision was maintaining a capability in the Defense Department--not doing a favor to a company.

Q: But the article alleges directly, and I submit directly as well as implying in several occasions, that the Procurement Command, in accordance with a long-established policy of the federal government, rejected Mr. Augustine's proposal that the Pentagon help to underwrite this acquisition because it was an acquisition. Mr. Deutch, according to Newsday, ordered the Procurement Command to rescind that policy. Newsday indicates that that met with your approval. So, the recommendation went forward for a $60 million expenditure to help Martin Marietta acquire this subsidiary of this other company, General Dynamics.

The broader policy question that comes to my mind is, what is in the public interest and how is the public interest served by using $60 million of U.S. treasure so that a private entity can acquire a portion of another private entity?

A: I don't want to comment on the specifics of the case because it's not fresh in my mind. This event happened many months ago. I will be happy to do that, and I will have to do it now that the question has come up, but the issue arose after I came on the trip and I just have not had time to do the research on it. But I

repeat the two basic points that I have, that any decision that Deutch made on this was done because he believed he was preserving a capability important to the Defense Department. Secondly, there is no reasonable connection between that decision and any connection he has with Martin, because he has no connection with Martin. He severed all of his connections with Martin a year and a half ago.

Q: Yes, sir. I understand that. But let me just say that...

A: Let me say one other thing. As the acquisition executive, he makes, I don't know, a hundred decisions a month, many of which are in conflict with the recommendations given to him by the service command. This was one of many such decisions he made. Every one that he makes is subject to somebody second guessing him and interpreting. It is really difficult for a person to do his job when every time somebody disagrees with a conclusion he makes that they then imply that there's somehow some conflict that he has in doing that.

Q: I respect that, but let me just ask this follow-up question. It goes back to the other part of what I think was Joel Connelly's question, and that is, $60 million is a large sum of money, and I can think of other capital needs and capacity needs that can be put on a footing with the perceived requirements of the Pentagon. Transit, for example, is an area in which federal participation is going down, and yet we have urban areas that are choking on traffic congestion. Why is, in the broader public policy sense, and I respect the fact that as the Secretary of Defense-- I'm getting a little far afield here with this example, but the larger point is a valid one. Why should we help a private entity acquire one other firm because we want to preserve some defense capacity that we may or may not have, when we have a demonstrable need, immediately, in many areas for capital investment? What's the value of that?

A: The specifics of this case have to be argued on their own merits. The general question you're raising is why is it that we would want to preserve some industrial capability to develop and produce weapon systems when we're not fighting a war? I guess the answer is... Let me give you an example by analogy.

When we went into Desert Storm, the weapon systems we used there in '91, I guess, were systems that were developed during the mid to late '70s when I was in the Pentagon as the Under Secretary. All of those systems that I was working on then were systems which were applied in a contingency which we had no way of anticipating back in the late '70s. It takes 10 to 15 years from the time you start industrial capability developing systems until they get in the force and are used in real contingencies.

So, we're talking now about capabilities which if the country needs them, they will be using them in the first decade of the next century. I'm not wise enough

to forecast what contingencies we're going to have in the first decade of the next century, so we try to provide a reasonably broad capability for that.

Q: Last Sunday, the New York Times Magazine had a big piece on Area 51, which the Pentagon calls it. I'd like you to refer to what you've just been saying and can you tell me, as a taxpayer, what is this? And secondly, can you tell me even in the most general terms what's going on there, for which I am presumably paying billions of dollars with others like me, is helping to develop that capability and so on, which we might need 10 or 15 years down the line.

A: I'll do it, again, by example rather than trying to describe what's going on there today, which I don't really care to do. I can tell you what was going on there in the last '70s when I was, again, developing weapon systems in the Pentagon, which was the F-117 was developed there, entirely. And that's the stealth aircraft. That aircraft, again, only manifested itself in a real application 14 of 15 years later in Desert Storm. But there is no question in my mind that the application, that the effectiveness of that airplane, the extent to which that airplane increases the effectiveness of U.S. military forces is very great indeed. That's one of the things that Area 51 did at one time in history.

Q: I'd like to go back, for a moment, before we leave this matter. The Newsday story says that you obtained a waiver from ethic regulations so that this deal could be completed. Is that correct?

A: Say that again.

Q: It says that you obtained a waiver of ethics regulations against dealing with former employers while implementing the agreement. Is that correct?

A: That's not effective today. We were required to have a waiver for the first year. That time has already passed.

There are two different bodies which oversee the ethics on issues like this. One of them is the Office of Ethics which has, every presidential appointee has to have his financial forms and so on, approved by them. The other is the Senate Armed Services Committee which reviews ethics on their own.

The Office of Ethics position is that you not only have to divest yourself of all of your holdings of any defense-related company, but in addition to that, you have to recuse yourself from dealing with those companies for a year, one year, after you go into office. I was prepared to do that.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, on the other hand, says not only do you have to divest yourself, but they do not want you to recuse yourself from the

companies, because they believe you will not be able to do your job effectively if you simply pass on decisions involving these companies. Therefore, they favor getting a waiver of that one year requirement.

So in response to these two different conflicting guidances, I got a waiver for one year for that purpose. That waiver dealt from the period of February of '93 to February of '94. I'm not now operating under the waiver. I have no restrictions.

Q: Was that waiver specifically designated to complete this deal, or was it a blanket waiver?

A: It was a blanket waiver. It simply said that I was free to deal with former employers, provided I'd completely and totally divested myself of any involvement with them, which indeed, I have.

I might say that if you want to pursue this broader question of whether our ethics regulations, whether the process that is being used is strict enough or not strict enough for presidential appointees, I would suggest a good source of information is the Senate Armed Services Committee which considers themselves, quite appropriately, as a final arbiter in this question. They have to approve, on the basis of FBI reports and on the basis of a set of financial reports that thick, and on the basis of reports from the Office of Government Ethics, they have to then finally approve whether a person is appropriately fit to do his job. They did approve it in my case, and in Dr. Deutch's cases, and indeed, they were the ones that insisted on waiving that one year recusal, which otherwise, as I said, I would be willing to do.

The recusal doesn't affect me in any way. It just limits the ability to do the job, and that was their point.

Q: Back to Korea. If I understood you, you said it would take more than a few days to build up a sufficient number of ground forces, traditional forces. Is that to suggest that if there was a North Korean invasion we would have losses before we were able to repel it, or can the air forces and the like deal with an invasion if there were one?

A: Any invasion of a force of a million men coming across into South Korea is going to have heavy losses associated with it. The purpose of rapid reinforcement is to minimize those losses. There's no way of avoiding them. It's trying to minimize them and bring the war to end as quickly as possible. All of our scenarios, as I say, show us winning the war, but the more quickly we can get the reinforcements there, the more quickly we win it and the fewer the losses on all sides.

Q: Has any (inaudible) been taken in anticipation of that, in order to move forces closer to that region?

A: The U.S. and South Korean forces are deployed, also have a forward deployment. Not as intense as the ones of North Korea because they're intended for defensive rather than offensive measures. When Ed Offley is in Korea, he will probably go up to the DMZ, and on the way there he will pass the 2nd Infantry Division which is located north of Seoul of the U.S., and the 1st Infantry Division of South Korea which is located even farther north. He will see very well equipped, very well trained, and highly ready troops ready to meet an invasion.

The main purpose of our rapid reinforcement plans is to bring massive air power to there very early in the operation.

Q: What sort of conventional missile capability does North Korea have?

A: They have SCUDs. They have a version of the SCUD. The SCUD is the generic term and there are many different versions of it. They manufactured them themselves. It's their own version of SCUD. It's capable of putting, perhaps, a 2,000 pound payload for a few hundred miles with very little accuracy. So it's a terror weapon, or a weapon that can be used against cities. It's not a very effective weapon against military targets.

There's a possibility that they have chemical warheads for the SCUDs which would increase the radius of effectiveness of them and make them a more formidable weapon against even a military target like an airfield or a port. That's why we elected to deploy Patriots over there earlier this spring. We have the Patriot II deployed, particularly, to provide defense for military targets against possible SCUD attacks. They are not there to defend Seoul or any other city. It's not an appropriate system for defending a large urban area. It's designed to defend military or point targets, and not able to do a very good job. All of the debate about Patriot was concerning its use for an application for which it was never designed, which is defending a large urban area. If the Patriot hits and destroys the missile, the missile still rains fragments and metal down on the ground, and if you're in a large area down there, it can still cause damage on the ground.

Q: Can I follow up a little bit on the nature of the adversary that we are facing here? Daily, I read columns written by people thousands of miles away who have never been in North Korea speculating on the motives of Kim Il Sung. They seem to come down in three categories--that he wants inclusion and respect in the community of nations; two, that he perhaps still wants to conquer the Korean Peninsula. He's 82 years old and there might not be that much time left to do so. Third, he is desperate to maintain as the great leader of the state, such as it is, that he has built, so that he can pass it on to his son, the [inaudible] leader.

Can you, presumably with a good deal more information that you can draw on, speculate on which, if any, of these assessments may be correct?

A: I have met many times with Korean experts, North Korean experts, with intelligence experts. I've listened to almost anything anybody has to tell me about what is motivating Kim Il Sung and the North Korean government. It comes down to those three alternatives which you just specified. Each of the experts has his own view as to which of those three is motivating him.

I have never found any basis for making a judgment among them, and that means, then, that our policy has to be designed in a very special way. We, on the one hand, had to be prepared to take advantage of openings in case he is truly seeking some sort of an accommodation--wants to peacefully find a way of pacifying the Korean Peninsula. We should not assume that's not the case, and proceeding in these talks with him next month are based precisely on that judgment. If this is a real opportunity, we owe it to ourselves and our children to take advantage of that opportunity, and that's what we're doing.

On the other hand, we must not be so naive as to believe that that is necessarily the case. That is that he may have, in his mind, that he must, as a first priority, secure the survival of the regime and that, in order to do that, he must have nuclear weapons and that all of these talks are just a way of stalling while he gets to that point. It was for that reason that, when we agreed to the talks, we agreed to them on one condition. That is that, while we're talking, the nuclear weapon program is frozen. To be more precise, that he agrees during that period, not to process the spent fuel that came out of the reactor and not to refuel the reactor, and to meet both of those commitments in verifiable ways. That was a very important part, and that's what we were doing, trying to hedge against the possibility that this last conclusion might be the real world.

Q: Talking about the consequences, the outcome of a ground, tactical ground war. To what extent does a nuclear deterrent play a role in preventing a major war?

A: Again, it's a matter of trying to read Kim Jon Il's mind, which nobody is very good at doing. That he is painfully aware of our nuclear capability there can be no doubt. He refers to it, and the North Korean government refers to it all the time. Also, notwithstanding the fact that we do not have nuclear weapons based in South Korea, we have a formidable nuclear capability which can be brought to bear in North Korea very, very quickly.

So, I believe there is a deterrence effect on the North Korean government because of our nuclear capability. I cannot certify that because I have no way of

really knowing what he's thinking. I do know that he is very aware of what our nuclear capability is.

Let me just add one other thing to that. I believe we are quite capable of defeating any North Korean attack with our conventional forces alone. That is, I do not believe we have to invoke nuclear weapons in order to defeat. It's always been our objective to have sufficient conventional forces, sufficient conventional capability, that those alone are capable of defeating a North Korean attack.

Q: Can I shift the discussion to Haiti? While the Administration is waiting to see the effects of its financial or economic sanctions, what kind of defense contingency plans are being made?

A: We have had, for some time, contingency plans for a variety of different circumstances developed in Haiti, including the possibility that we might have to go in with a military force. We're not pursuing that as an option now. We're pursuing, as you well know, putting pressure, diplomatic and political pressure, on the Haitian government with the objective of that pressure forcing the military government to step down.

If that happens, if that is successful, then we will still need to contemplate a security force going in as a peacekeeping force, to help reestablish the security in Haiti. For that reason, we have been discussing with the United Nations the authorization of what's called UNMIH which is a UN peacekeeping force that would go into Haiti at such time as the military force leaves, under whatever conditions, and provides the restructuring and re-establishment of security on the island.

Q: You can talk about that, but at the same time, I think a lot of American policy makers, perhaps even yourself, can close your eyes and see a situation if we do go in, of a contingent of American Marine peacekeepers hunkered down in a barracks in Port au Prince with a bunch of very well-armed Ton Ton Makuts going by in the middle of the night and spraying them with small weapons fire and perhaps even setting off bombs.

With the people on the other side so well armed, not to take on American forces but certainly to harass and kill American soldiers once we move in, is there any contingency plan for preventing a quagmire if we go in?

A: Let me start off by saying that nobody involved in any of the contingency plans for Haiti is sanguine about the points that you're mentioning. That is, we have ample evidence that peacekeeping forces in unsettled countries like Haiti are a dangerous business. If we were to go into Haiti, we would go in with the expectation that it would be a dangerous business.

The objective would be, however, in this peacekeeping force, would not be to become the new government or the new security force at Haiti. It would be to bring up, to structure, to train, a local security force so that we could pull our forces out as soon as that was feasible. But the people who have looked seriously at that do not believe that could be done quickly or easily. We see this as a tough task.

Q: Earlier this week, in Washington you said that we ought to give some time for economic sanctions to work before we seriously consider military intervention. How much time should we give them? What is the cutoff?

A: I would not attempt to put a number on that. But we're not close to that point yet, certainly. Some of these sanctions are just starting to cut in now. So we will need some time, and I cannot put a time estimate on how long that would be.

It's also a function, I might say, of what happens in Haiti. We've seen some indications in the last few days that the level of repression may be increasing in Haiti. That could influence the time scale. We've also seen, partly as a result of that increased pressure, a great increase in the number of boat people that are coming out. All of those are dynamics which would affect that equation. It's not just that I cannot give you a number for that. There is not a number for that right now. It is going to depend very much on how circumstances develop.

Q: What's your assessment of the political and popular support for that type of action? If it comes to that.

A: Can you be more specific about what action?

Q: To have forces as a peacekeeping...

A: A peacekeeping force in Haiti?

Q: Yes. Much as in Somalia.

A: I think the best way we will have of finding that out is in our congressional consultations. If we're going to put a sizeable peacekeeping force into Haiti, we will consult with the Congress before we do it. In the course of that consultation we'll not only get the views of the Congress, but their constituents will be getting views to them as well.

It's really difficult to try to forecast that. If you go back to the pre-Desert Storm, pre-Desert Shield era, and if you had taken a poll on the support for either going into Desert Shield or going into Desert Storm, I think you would have gotten

a very different answer earlier than you would later in the process as events unfolded.

You may remember, also, that the congressional debate that took place in December, just before we went into Desert Storm, was a very close vote. A week before that vote I would have been hard-pressed to forecast the outcome of it.

Q: I'm curious about something, Mr. Secretary, as regards Haiti. There has been a great deal of attention, including live television interviews with the military leadership there. Do they rule simply at the point of a gun, or are there private interests that shore them up and that, in fact, support this military kind of government? If so, who are they? Do they have ties to the U.S.? Are there U.S. financial interests involved in supporting the military rulers there? And I have a follow-up question to your response. (Laughter)

A: There are three rather distinct elements in Haiti today that need to be contended with. The first of them is the military leadership. Second, are the enlisted personnel in the Haitian army. Third, is the elite, people not in the government, not in the military, but the few hundred, or so, families that are the leaders there.

We think those families have a substantial influence on the military leadership, and do support them in various ways. We think that those families are going to be, were not hit much by the early sanctions we put on, but are going to be hit by these latter sanctions in a very substantial way.

Secondly, that the enlisted personnel play an important and almost an independent role in Haitian politics. The evidence is that they were the primary force behind the overthrow of Aristide in the first place, so they have to be contended with as a separate issue.

I can't tell you the extent to which individuals in the U.S. may be providing financial support for any of those three entities. I suppose, that has to be true in the case of the elites, the families. That's one of the reason the freeze on financial transactions and the freeze on transportation and visas and so on. To the extent that's true, these sanctions will have a profound effect on stopping it.

Q: There's got to be one question about Bill Clinton in here. Our President's policy walk, he has developed exhaustive knowledge of certain domestic issues including things about the Northwest. He probably knows more about Boeing aircraft sales and Airbus competition than just about anybody in this room. At the same time, however, there has been a great deal of the commontocracy in Washington, D.C. has been arguing of late that he does not focus on foreign policy

and defense issues with the exhaustiveness he devotes to domestic issues. Is there truth in that charge?

A: First of all, I couldn't, in an informed way, contrast the time he spends on one versus the time he spends on the other, but I can in an informed way describe the time and effort he puts on foreign policy and national security issues, because I share that time with him. So, I can comment on that part of the issue, and I can tell you that he spends a lot of time on it. He comes into these discussions well informed and well briefed, and he probes deeply and intelligently in getting to the bottom of issues.

I think, any impression that this is something he's casual about is entirely fellatious. I spent, I think it was last week when we were, I guess it was the week before last when we were leading up to the decision to open up talks with North Korea, I was probably with the President every day, an hour or two every day, and one day we were six hours. Talking not just about Korea, but talking about a whole set of national security issues. Some of those meetings were small groups where there were just three or four of his principal national security advisers. Some of them were somewhat larger groups where he had the so-called principals involved with national security available, and one or two of them were Cabinet meetings at that time.

My personal observation is that he spends a lot of time, a lot of energy, and brings a lot of insight to these problems. That's a straight forward and direct answer. That's commenting on the only thing that I have first-hand knowledge of, which is what time he spends and effort he spends, and insights he brings into national security policy, which I'm dealing with.

Q: Let me ask you just as a follow on to that question then, many of the critics of this Administration that complain about its foreign policy, the way it's conducted, and its philosophy, it seems to me are suffering from withdrawal from the convenience and the certainty of the policy of containment. As a person who's been involved in this in your professional life, will you take a step back and give us the benefit of your view of the period that we're in. We are, after all, only a few years away from the coming down of the Berlin Wall, the changing of the guard in Russia and so forth.

Is it a realistic expectation that we could somehow conceive and install a new policy with the kind of clarity that the containment policy gave us, given the conditions of the world today?

A: That is, I don't mean this in a patronizing way, is a brilliant question. That is the essence of this issue.

We understand and have pocketed the containment policy and the whole set of institutions and programs that we built up to support it. That policy took us about five years to evolve. It was not at all clear in the course of evolution what the final outcome of it was going to be. It only seems very clear in retrospect. After we evolved that, we built up a whole series of institutions and programs to implement it. NATO, COCOM, all of these policies and programs stem directly from the judgment that we're going to, that entering the Cold War and containment was going to be the overriding feature of our policy.

It's been clear for about five years now that that policy was obsolete. People have struggled to try to find not only a term to describe the new policy, of which some people have tried to use constructive engagement--it doesn't have quite the ring that containment had to it. But more importantly, it's not just the name, it's trying to get a description of what the policy is going to be. But what is absolutely clear is it will not have the simplicity and the clarity of the containment policy because we're not dealing with a monolithic problem, which is the threat of world domination by communist expansion. What we're dealing with is a complex, variegated problem.

One component of that problem goes back to the old communist threat, Soviet Union threat problem. Just one component. That component is what our policy should be with respect to the remnants of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact? What policy in particular should we be taking relative to Russia and Ukraine today?

The Administration, with respect to that component of the policy, has a clear policy which we've articulated, I think, quite clearly. Nobody pays very much attention to it because it's not a headline issue. Nothing much is happening there. Indeed, as long as nothing much is happening, it's probably a pretty good indication that we're moving along all right.

I would bring to your attention a paper I wrote on that subject that describes our new policy for Russia, and the name I have chosen for it is a pragmatic partnership, instead of calling it cooperative engagement. The reason I call it that is cooperative engagement suggests we're friends with them. The partnership captures the friend part of it. The pragmatic captures the fact that number one, they still have 25,000 nuclear weapons; and number two, they're in turmoil--political and economic turmoil, and nobody knows where the country's going to go a year from now or five years from now. Pragmatically, we have to be prepared for a reversion or relapse which, while it will never reinstate the threat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to us again, but it could reinstitute a nuclear threat again. So, we have to be pragmatic.

A major consequence of that effort, and the program we are embarking on which involves a lot of my time and effort and a lot of defense resources, is constructively helping the Soviet Union dismantle their nuclear weapons.

I got a report just yesterday that 300 nuclear weapons in Ukraine have already been dismantled through the resources and the efforts we're putting to help get that happen. It took an enormous effort--300 out of the 2,000 which they have and which they're in the process of dismantling. We got an agreement in January between Yeltsin and Krabchuk and Clinton to do that. The reason it was so complicated is because the Ukrainians have the weapons and the Russians have the dismantlement facility and they don't trust each other. It took the U.S. as an intermediary to get that to happen, and it took the lubrication of U.S. Defense Department dollars to pay for the cost of making that happen. That's one crucial element of this pragmatic.

But besides the problems in Russia and Ukraine, where I believe our policies are fairly clearly articulated, there's a second big issue which is still in the process of evolving which is how we use military force or the threat of military force, to affect regional conflicts which are occurring around the world. We faced that problem in a fairly simple conceptual form in Desert Storm. We will be faced with that problem in other forms in the decade ahead of us, that we had to be prepared to face it. We're facing it most prominently in Bosnia today. If you want to talk separately about Bosnia I'd be happy to do it, but that is almost a litmus test of whether we can effectively apply military power or the threat of military power to influence or to curtail regional conflicts in the world.

The third aspect which we need to articulate new policies on is how to deal with peacekeeping and humanitarian needs which arise all over the world from Rwanda to Somalia, and Haiti, and we have recently articulated the Administration's policy on that. It took us a year to put it together. It's called PDD-25, I think. I think major chunks of that are unclassified and available for the public to read, and it spells out a pretty clear policy on how to do it.

A long-winded answer to the question, but there are three components to it in the new world. One is how you deal with the remnants of the Soviet Union, in particular the nuclear threat posed by that. The second is how you...

Q: ...people that he is on track would help to quell some of this criticism which strikes me as being off the mark.

Do you feel that the President is being well used, if I can apply that term, or advised in the use of the bully pulpit here?

A: I think he can use the bully pulpit on national security affairs more extensively, should use it more extensively than he has. He was about to do that on the Korean issue when the possibility of the talks... We were about to proceed forward with applying sanctions and enhancing forces--both of them very risky steps, and he needed to lay out to the public fully the risks involved and why we were doing that, and he would have done that. Now I think he's sitting on that, until we get the talks started, to see what, in fact, starts to unfold from those talks before he comes back to the public. Yes, I think he will use it more in the future.

I owe you one thing, by the way, in these talks. Of the subjects we've talked about, there was a particular question which I just wasn't prepared to answer at the time which is the substance of the particular $60 million program that was described in that. I just haven't had enough time to look into that. I don't remember it, to be honest with you. Since this only came up since I was on the trip I haven't had time to look into it and defend that particular decision, quite aside from the conflict of interest question, whether it was a wise public policy issue. I will be prepared to do that, and if you'd like, I will call one of you tomorrow and get that response to you.

Q: Tuesday would be very much appreciated.

A: I have to do it anyway, because you will not be the only one to be raising that question.

Q: Thank you very much.

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